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PROPORTIONALITY IS A CENTRAL concept in the laws of sentencing, particularly
in jurisdictions that recognize the State’s power over the liberty interests of
citizens.1 In several jurisdictions, the principle can be found in statute drafted
with varying degrees of specifcity.2
1.

2.

Richard Frase et al, “Proportionality of Punishment in Common Law jurisdictions and
in Germany” in Kai Ambos et al, eds, Core Issues in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice
(Cambridge University Press, 2020) 213 at 213; Julian V Roberts & Lyndon Harris,
“Sentencing Guidelines Outside the United States” in Cassia Spohn & Pauline K
Brennan, eds, Handbook on Sentencing Policies and Practices in the 21st Century (Routledge,
2019) 68 at 68-86.
In Canada, the principle is explicit under s 718.1 of the Criminal Code. In England
and Wales, although the statute is less explicit, proportionality can be inferred from key
provisions that relate to the use of sanction and the defnition of crime seriousness. See
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718(1); Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK), c 44, s 143(1).
See also Andrew Ashworth, “Re-Evaluating the Justifcations for Aggravation and Mitigation
at Sentencing” in Julian V Roberts, ed, Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge
University Press, 2011) 21 [Ashworth, “Aggravation and Mitigation”].
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Tis article argues that proportionality is a dynamic concept that has evolved
across theoretical conceptions of punishment, time, and jurisdiction. It traces the
evolution of proportionality within retributive, desert-based, and consequentialist
theories of punishment. Anchoring itself in the Canadian context, this article
argues that Canada’s statutory regime predominantly relies on a desert-based
conception of proportionality, which has evolved with its underlying theory of
punishment. Indeed, this article highlights that a desert-based conception of
proportionality has increasingly integrated advances in scientifc and experiential
knowledge that challenge some of its pre-existing assumptions. Further, this article
posits that jurisprudential evolution of proportionality in Canada has brought it
closer to a consequentialist framework. Tis development has contributed to the
multiplication of meanings of proportionality, rooted in diferent and conficting
rationales. Finally, this article ofers some conceptual nuances that could achieve
greater clarity, structure, and legitimacy in Canadian sentencing.
Tis article’s contributions are two-fold. First, through its engagement
with various conceptions of proportionality, it contributes to the literature on
punishment and sentencing theory by providing additional tools for sentencing
theorists to examine, reconsider, fne-tune, or reafrm underlying rationales
and their respective relevant factors. Second, by providing decision-makers
with distinctions that expose the underlying rationales and assumptions of
proportionality, this article contributes to more principled sentencing decisions.
Tis can allow for the creation of a conceptual and methodological framework
that classifes sentencing factors consistent with these rationales.
Part I of the article situates proportionality and its evolution within the main
theories of punishment, namely retributivist and consequentialist theories. Part
II turns to the analysis of the principle of proportionality in Canada, relying
predominantly on Supreme Court of Canada decisions since it provides fnal
conceptual guidance on sentencing principles across the country. Tis analysis
suggests that the concept of proportionality in Canada was primarily rooted
within an evolving retributive just deserts framework, but in recent years has
been shifted primarily to consequentialist grounds. Tis article argues that the
multiplication of understandings impedes the development of a principled
conception of proportionality. Part III proposes a dynamic and principled
framework of proportionality grounded within a desert-based rationale. Tis
framework proposes conceptual nuances that can account for various aims and
ofer greater clarity in sentencing, while minimizing the use of criminal law for
achieving certain objectives.
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I. UNDERLYING THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND
CONCEPTIONS OF PROPORTIONALITY
Te concept of proportionality can be traced back to the Magna Carta3 and is
rooted in liberal modern theories of punishment. As Andrew Ashworth notes,
considerations proper to proportionality should “fow from the same source
as the rationale(s) of sentencing.”4 Marie-Eve Sylvestre also highlights that
proportionality necessarily operates within an underlying theory of punishment.5
Modern theories of punishment within the common law are classifed as
either retributive or consequentialist. Within traditional retributive theories,
the justifcation of punishment fows directly from the person’s desert.6 Tere
is an obligation to punish sufciently to speak out against the ofence and the
ofender has a “right” to be punished, as punishment honours them as a rational
being with intrinsic value.7 According to this theory, a fnding of guilt should
be a necessary condition to justify punishment,8 and punishment should not be
administered to promote other goals that are not tied to censuring the ofender’s
wrongdoing9 since that would instrumentalize the ofender and increase the risk
of rendering sentences arbitrary and indeterminate. Most critics have highlighted
that establishing a precise guide for desert is hard to achieve. As will be seen,
Andrew von Hirsch and Ashworth have attempted to do this with a just deserts
understanding of proportionality.
Consequentialist (utilitarian) theories of punishment consider punishment
harmful or dissatisfying to those punished, and thus punishment can be justifed
only to the extent that the benefts and satisfaction it produces, in aggregate,
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

In 1215, the Magna Carta conceived a form of proportionality: “For a trivial ofence, a free
man shall be fned only in proportion to the degree of his ofence, and for a serious ofence
correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of this livelihood.” See John R Vile,
Founding Documents of America: Documents Decoded (ABC-CLIO, 2015) at 5.
Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 2nd ed (Butterworths, 1995) at 147.
Marie-Eve Sylvestre, “Te (Re)Discovery of the Proportionality Principle in Sentencing
in Ipeelee: Constitutionalization and the Emergence of Collective Responsibility”
(2013) 63 SCLR 461.
Allan Manson, Te Law of Sentencing (Irwin Law, 2001) at 32.
Mike C Materni, “Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice” (2013) 2 Br J Am Leg
Studies 263 at 274.
Morris J Fish, “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment”
(2008) 28 Oxford J Leg Stud 57 at 63.
Immanuel Kant, Te Philosophy of Law. An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, translated by W Hastie (T&T Clark, 1887); Manson,
supra note 6 at 32-40.
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outweigh the harm.10 It needs to adhere to the principle of utility, which can
include objectives of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.11 Tese
theories have been described as prospective because the aim of punishment is
forward-looking rather than focused on the past ofence.12 Te main critics of
these theories have doubted the extent to which any of the traditional crime
control purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation can be
achieved through punishment, and therefore consideration and integration of
these factors within sentencing remain imprecise.13 Moreover, consequentialist
factors have also heavily relied on predictions, including of risk and dangerousness,
which have in great part contributed to the over-incarceration of marginalized
and minority groups in the criminal justice process.14
Te frst liberal account of proportionate sanctions was utilitarian and
focused on objectives of crime prevention, especially general deterrence.
Cesare di Beccaria’s eighteenth-century approach to punishment suggested that
“punishments…should be chosen in due proportion to the crime so as to make
the most efcacious and lasting impression on the minds of men, and the least

10. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation, ed by JH
Burns & HLA Hart (Clarendon Press, 1996) at 11-13; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
(Penguin Books, 1985).
11. Andrew von Hirsch, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment” (1992) 16 Crime &
Justice 55 at 57-58; Manson, supra note 6 at 32, 43-46.
12. Fish, supra note 8 at 63, 64.
13. For instance, achieving rehabilitation and deterrence through punishment is problematic
as punishment does not change behaviour, especially when the actions are rooted in
marginalization, discrimination and poverty. See Maria Dugas, “Committing to Justice:
Te Case for Impact of Race and Culture Assessments in Sentencing African Canadian
Ofenders” (2020) 43 Dal LJ 103.
14. Bernard E Harcourt, “Risk as a Proxy for Race: Te Dangers of Risk Assessment”
(2015) 27 Fed Sentencing Rep 237. Further, research into Gladue reports that outline
Indigenous background has shown that when tied to consequentialist grounds, including
the reduction of crime rates by imposing sentences that efectively deter criminality and
rehabilitate ofenders, these aims have not been met; these reports have often been used
by the court to assess the risk of the ofender reofending, which has undermined eforts
to reduce over incarceration. Tis has had unintended discriminatory consequences by
drawing decision-makers’ attention to race and risk factors. See Kelly Hannah-Mofat &
Paula Maurutto, “Re-Contextualizing Pre-Sentence Reports: Risk and Race” (2010) 12
Punishment & Society 262; Debra Parkes & David Milward, “Gladue: Beyond Myth and
Towards Implementation in Manitoba” (2012) 35 Man LJ 84. It is worth highlighting that
additional factors have contributed to this reality, notably a colonial culture and systemic
racism that have permeated the application of criminal justice in Canada, giving rise to the
over-incarceration of Indigenous and racialized people.
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painful impressions on the body of the criminal.”15 Early retributive theorists
referred to proportionality by highlighting that, to be morally justifable,
punishment had to be proportionate to desert—suggesting that the seriousness
of the punishment must precisely match the extent of the ofender’s desert.16
Despite its early iterations, academic literature only renewed its interest
in proportionality in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly within just deserts
theory, which, “gives the principle a dominant role”17 and ofers a framework
for measuring sentencing severity by focusing on the seriousness of the ofence.
Desert theorists recognized that proportionality can be found in utilitarian
theories but highlight that these “[o]ther viewpoints permit proportionality to be
trumped, to a greater or a lesser degree, by ulterior concerns such as those of crime
control.”18 Te following discussion examines the evolution and understanding
of proportionality within retributive and consequentialist underlying rationales.
A. JUST DESERTS AND PROPORTIONALITY

Retributivists have developed a substantive framework to advance the central
role of proportionality in sentencing. Tey retain retribution as a justifcation
for punishment, but also recognize that the imposition of sanctions should
result in a tangible social beneft.19 Desert theorists, such as von Hirsch and
15.
16.
17.
18.

Of Crimes and Punishments, translated by Jane Grigson (Marsilio, 1996) at 49.
Kant, supra note 9.
von Hirsch, supra note 11 at 56.
Ibid. See e.g. Adrian Hoel, “Te Sentencing Provisions of the International Criminal Court:
Common Law, Civil Law, or Both?” (2007) 33 Monash UL Rev 264 at 288 (“Given that
the sentencing provisions of the ICC have endorsed proportionality, it would seem to
be uncontentious that retribution will be endorsed as the primary sentencing purpose”);
Michael Tonry, “Selective Incapacitation: Te Debate Over its Ethics” in Andrew von Hirsch
& Andrew Ashworth, eds, Principled Sentencing (Northeastern University Press, 1992)
166 (implying that the concept of proportionality is entirely retributive and stating that
proportionality is relatively unimportant to utilitarians).
19. Just deserts theorists, such as von Hirsch, refer to “defning” retributivism, meaning that
principles of just deserts should defne the degree of punishment severity as precisely as
possible, no more and no less. Tey recognize that departures from proportionality can
at times be justifable but stand in need of defence. Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice:
Te Choice of Punishments (Hill and Wang, 1976); von Hirsch, supra note 11 at 56. Tis
is diferent from Norval Morris’s notion of “limiting retributivism,” which suggests that
desert remains partly relevant to proportionality but functions only as an upper and lower
limit on just punishment. Tis theory allows all traditional punishment purposes to play
a role but places retributive outer limits both on who may be punished (only those who
are blameworthy), and how hard they may be punished (within a range of penalties that
would widely be viewed as neither unfairly severe nor unduly lenient). See Norval Morris,
“Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation” in Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch, eds,
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Ashworth, recognize the communicative and censuring functions of punishment.
Tus, proportionality enables the fair expression and communicative function
of punishment, conveying censure to the ofender, the victim, and society.20
Extraneous considerations as part of proportionality would disregard the
censuring implications of punishment and the principle would be much less
useful in guiding sentencers. It also risks prioritizing certain rationales including
objectives such as deterrence and rehabilitation that instrumentalize the ofender
and, as highlighted above, can be inefective in attaining those aims within the
criminal justice system. While desert theorists recognize that sentences can
include secondary purposes, these considerations are understood as secondary
and extraneous to proportionality.
According to just deserts, proportionality enables fairness by scaling
punishments in relation to the ofence.21 Tis scaling supposes that societies
judge punishments on their severity by choosing “anchoring points” based on
convention (cardinal proportionality). From there, sentencing judges are guided
by ordinal proportionality: A sentence must refect the gravity of the ofence
relative to other ofences and the various degrees of seriousness in the range
of conduct covered by the ofence. Within this framework, proportionality is
primarily concerned with measuring sentence severity to facilitate fairness,
consistency, parity, and predictability in sentencing.22 It is understood that each
ofender should receive an equally severe sentence as those who committed
ofences of equal seriousness. Critics have highlighted that this logic must give
way whenever it is at odds with considerations that they deem more important,
such as the efective pursuit of instrumental goals—deterrence, rehabilitation,
and the like.23

20.
21.
22.
23.

Sentencing (Oxford University Press, 1981) 257. More recently, Richard Frase suggests that
proportionality should largely be a matter of retributive considerations, with utilitarian
concerns applicable only within a narrow range of deserved sentences. See Richard S
Frase, “Limiting Retributivism” in Michael Tonry, ed, Te Future of Imprisonment (Oxford
University Press, 2003) 83 [Frase, “Limiting Retributivism”]. For desert theorists, however,
limiting retributivism is mainly imposed on the basis of consequences, with a very loose
outer limit—highlighting that desert and retributive dimensions are not the underlying
aspects of this theory. See Malcolm Torburn & Allan Manson, “Te Sentencing Teory
Debate: Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning” (2007) 10 New Crim L Rev
278 at 279, 286-87.
Ashworth, “Aggravation and Mitigation,” supra note 2 at 28; Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew
Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford University Press, 2005).
von Hirsch, supra note 11 at 55-56.
Ibid.
Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law (University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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Finally, just deserts proportionality provides a framework for individualized
desert-based calibration because sentences are intended to refect adequate
censure by highlighting the level of blame for the ofence. Te framework focuses
on two constitutive components: the gravity of the ofence (harm component)
and the level of blameworthiness (culpability) of the ofender. In this sense,
the sentence needs to be calibrated so it is neither too severe nor too lenient in
light of these components. Critics of this approach have argued that the focus
on crime seriousness and sentence severity can be too formalistic. By focusing
almost exclusively on ftting punishments to particular crimes, von Hirsch and
Ashworth have given the impression over the years of being uninterested in other
aspects of the ofender’s situation.24 However, as will be discussed, desert theory
has evolved, allowing for more fexibility to consider additional factors that are
relevant to the ofender’s situation in relation to blame and harm.
As will be seen, concepts such as censure, punishment, culpability, and
harm have evolved within desert theory, yet remain grounded in determining
the level of blame in relation to the gravity of the ofence. Current desert-based
proportionality grounds its approach in greater individualization and attention
to social and experiential contexts by expanding the relevant factors that can be
taken into account to ascribe the level of guilt and to understand harm.
1.

THE DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF CENSURE AND PUNISHMENT

As highlighted above, desert-based proportionality serves to ensure the fair
expression and communicative function of punishment, which conveys censure to
the ofender, the victim, and society.25 Te normative message relating to censure
treats the ofender as an agent capable of moral deliberation and response without
being instrumentalized. Tis resonates with Joel Feinberg’s understanding of
punishment, described as “a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation.”26

24. See Torburn & Manson, supra note 19.
25. Ashworth, “Aggravation and Mitigation,” supra note 2 at 254; von Hirsch & Ashworth,
supra note 20. Censure rooted within a just deserts framework with an individualized and
experiential conception of blame, discussed below, would be much more conducive to
limiting the over-incarceration of marginalized groups than consequentialist accounts which
have in great part contributed to the production of inequalities in sentencing as a product of
risk-based analyses.
26. “Te Expressive Function of Punishment” in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Teory of
Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 1970) 95 at 98.
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According to desert theorists, censure “serves only to give the actor the
opportunity to make a response”27 and “as an appeal to people’s sense of the
conduct’s wrongfulness.”28 Traditional desert theory, contrary to penance
theory,29 suggests that censure is not aimed at provoking a discursive response,
and therefore there is no need to tailor the censuring response to the actor’s
supposed degree of receptivity.
In recent years, certain retributivists have re-conceptualized censure and
punishment as a more dynamic form of communication. While they recognize
that the communicative dimension of punishment is not aimed at provoking a
response, they nevertheless suggest that if the ofender takes the opportunity to
respond, this can be considered at sentencing and during the administration of
the sentence.30 Tis responsive view of penal censure suggests that the sentence
may evolve in response to certain acts of the ofender.31 Accordingly, a responsive
censure-based approach argues that the censuring authority, whether it be the
sentencer or the administrator of the sentence, should be attentive to the fruits
of the ofender’s moral deliberation, as they may afect the degree of censure
that is (or remains) appropriate. Te actions that serve to mitigate the degree of
censure necessary are of a specifc nature: Tey must be related to the ofence for
which censure was originally expressed. Tey can include, for instance, conduct
post-conviction, such as an ofender who undertakes reparative steps to address
the harm caused, expression of remorse, and guilty pleas. It is argued that these
responses to censure can result in a diminished punishment. Contrary to traditional
desert theory, the ofender is recognized as a responsive agent who partakes in a
dialogue and cannot be ignored.32 Accordingly, this approach enables authorities

27. von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 20 at 17-18 [emphasis in original].
28. Ibid [emphasis in original].
29. RA Duf, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge University Press, 1986) [Duf, Trials and
Punishments]; Antony Duf, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford University
Press, 2001) [Duf, Punishment, Communication, and Community].
30. Julian V Roberts & Netanel Dagan, “Te Evolution of Retributive Punishment: From Static
Desert to Responsive Penal Censure” in Antje du Bois-Pedain & Anthony E Bottoms, eds,
Penal Censure: Engagements Within and Beyond Desert Teory (Hart, 2019) 141 at 143.
31. Ibid.
32. Hannah Maslen, Remorse, Penal Teory and Sentencing (Hart, 2015).
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to review the original censuring decision over the years, in order to account for
the prisoner’s response to the sentence’s message in relation to the ofence.33
Te notion of punishment has also evolved within desert-based rationales.
For instance, authors have recognized the possibility for restorative justice, fnes,
and conditional sentences to communicate censure, and therefore to become
recognized as providing diferent alternatives to imprisonment, which has
been regarded as the sentence of reference over the last century.34 Tese recent
understandings of punishment have also relied on desert-based communicative
theory to suggest that, since messages need to be understood by ofenders and
society, it is important to account for the ofender’s experience of punishment35
instead of understanding punishment severity by merely relying on abstract
accounts of typical individuals. Tis theoretical position challenges quantitative
understandings of punishment, by pointing to empirical studies that suggest that
punishments twice as severe in experiential terms are not necessarily twice as
long.36 Tis conception of punishment also highlights that the scaling of severity
based on the types of sanctions can vary to account for experience.37
2.

CULPABILITY (BLAME) AND ITS EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP TO THE
OFFENCE

Ofender culpability (blame) and its impact have always been a consideration
in the ascription of guilt, but the relevant factors through which culpability
has been assessed have expanded. Under traditional desert theory, developed
by von Hirsch and Ashworth, factors considered relevant to culpability include
“factors of intent, motive and circumstances that determine the extent to which
33. Roberts & Dagan, supra note 30 at 155. Examples of responsive ofence-related factors
include the way the person addresses the harm inficted by compensating the victim’s loss:
showing sincere empathy and remorse; apologizing; taking responsibility for the harm.
Responsive factors unrelated to harm and culpability should be excluded from this account,
since they may rely on utilitarian aims such as diminishing reofending.
34. Kathleen Daly, “Restorative Justice: Te Real Story” (2002) 4 Punishment & Society 55 at
60; Duf, Punishment, Communication, and Community, supra note 29.
35. Adam J Kolber, “Te Subjective Experience of Punishment” (2009) 109 Colum L Rev 182.
36. Pierre Tremblay, “On Penal Metrics” (1988) 4 J Quantitative Criminology 225 at 235;
Robert E Harlow, John M Darely & Paul H Robinson, “Te Severity of Intermediate Penal
Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions”
(1995) 11 J Quantitative Criminology, 71; Mara F Schif, “Gauging the Intensity of
Criminal Sanctions: Developing the Criminal Punishment Severity Scale (CPSS)” (1997) 22
Crim Justice Rev 175.
37. For instance, banishment, imprisonment, fnes, restoration, and other types of sanctions may
be experienced diferently.
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the ofender should be held accountable for the act.”38 Hence, desert theorists
heavily relied on criminal law doctrines of culpability, such as intention,
recklessness, negligence, and excuses. Tey also acknowledged that culpability
extended beyond mere cognition to a wide range of volitional and situational
factors.39 For instance, diminished volitional capacity is a conceivable basis for
claiming reduced culpability.40 Such factors remain retrospective as they focus
on the ofender’s culpability during the commission of the ofence.41 Within this
traditional theory, “what’s done cannot be undone, as it were,”42 and the ofender’s
culpability remains intact, regardless of regrets or eforts to undo the act.
Factors such as redressing systemic wrongs, the pursuit of equality policies,
collateral efects of conviction and sentence on the ofender, reparation,
remorse, and other post-ofence matters43 are considered unrelated to harm and
culpability,44 and are thus referred to as “extraneous” and without bearing on the
determination of a proportionate sentence. Despite desert theorists’ commitment
to the dominant role of proportionality in the determination of principled
punishments, they also acknowledge that there are situations where departures
from proportionality are justifable, if explained.45
In recent years, desert theory has developed a more fexible understanding
of culpability grounded in social context. Indeed, it increasingly relies on the
advancement of interdisciplinary knowledge and empirical data to inform the
assessment of culpability and provides greater space to consider individualized
personal characteristics and the circumstances of the ofender in their
understanding of culpability.

38. Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis”
(1991) 11 Oxford J Leg Stud 1 at 2-3.
39. Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 6th ed (Cambridge University Press,
2015) at 158 [Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice].
40. For instance, mental disability is recognized as a factor that can diminish culpability on
the basis that a person’s capacity to comply with the law is impaired. See von Hirsch &
Ashworth, supra note 20 at 63.
41. As von Hirsch and Harnrahan highlight “judgments about seriousness are judgments about
past events…By waiting longer one learns nothing new.” See Andrew von Hirsch & Kathleen
J Hanrahan, Te Question of Parole: Retention, Reform, or Abolition? (Ballinger, 1979) at 29.
42. Julian V Roberts & Hannah Maslen, “After the Crime: Retributivism, Post-Ofence Conduct
and Penal Censure” in AP Simester, Antje du Bois-Pedain & Ulfrid Neumann, eds, Liberal
Criminal Teory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Hart, 2014) 88 at 89.
43. Ashworth, “Aggravation and Mitigation,” supra note 2.
44. Ibid at 27.
45. von Hirsch, supra note 11 at 56.
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For instance, desert theorists traditionally resisted seeing a nexus between
social deprivation and diminished culpability. While they recognized that there
can be a strong association between social deprivation and ofending behaviour,
they maintained that this does not deny the capacity to behave otherwise.46
Desert theory nuanced itself throughout the years by recognizing additional
studies that suggested that individuals within socially deprived circumstances
may fnd themselves under pressure to commit crime. It also acknowledged that
some people are trapped in a criminal lifestyle, with scarcely more capacity for
free choice than the person subjected to direct threats and that, therefore, they
should not be held to the same normative expectations as others. Hudson warned
that some assumptions around the notion of free will and culpability need to
be reconsidered:
[T]he notion of free will…is assumed in ideas of culpability....Legal reasoning seems
unable to appreciate that the existential view of the world as an arena for acting out
free choices is a perspective of the privileged, and that potential for self-actualization
is far from apparent to those whose lives are constricted by material or ideological
handicaps.47

Tere is an increasing understanding that human choice is a complex, interactive
process that involves both a distinctively human capacity for moral reasoning,
and strong instincts and inclinations.48
Based on these refections, desert theorists acknowledge that social deprivation
can constrain an ofender’s choice to an extent signifcant enough to reduce
their culpability.49 Tey highlight that the evidence on how socio-economic
diferences interact with the communities and institutions in which they live
remains uncertain and varying in degree. In recent years, evidence of this can
be grounded in lived experiences from marginalized communities that can
46. von Hirsch & Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing, supra note 20 at 63; Ashworth,
Sentencing and Criminal Justice, supra note 39 at 159; Michael S Moore, “Te Moral Worth
of Retribution” in Ferdinand Schoeman, ed, Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions
(Cambridge University Press, 1988) 179; Sanford H Kadish, Blame and Punishment: Essays in
the Criminal Law (Macmillan, 1987).
47. Barbara A Hudson, “Punishing the Poor: A Critique of the Dominance of Legal Reasoning
in Penal Policy and Practice” in Antony Duf et al, eds, Penal Teory and Practice: Tradition
and Innovation in Criminal Justice (Manchester University Press, 1994) at 302. Tis analysis
was referred to by just deserts theorists von Hirsch and Ashworth in Proportionate Sentencing
(supra note 20 at 72).
48. Anthony Bottoms, “Five Puzzles in von Hirsch’s Teory” in Andrew Ashworth & Martin
Wasik, eds, Fundamentals of Sentencing Teory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch
(Clarendon Press, 1998) 53 at 81–82.
49. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, supra note 39 at 159.
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be conveyed through various reports, including Gladue reports and Race and
Culture Assessments.50
Moreover, recent accounts of retributive proportionality expand culpability
beyond substantive criminal law doctrines and have recently found the
ofender’s prospective conduct following the ofence to be relevant. While the
ofender’s conduct before the ofence has always been a relevant consideration
in the ascription of guilt within retributive theories, prospective conduct was
traditionally excluded and has only recently been considered to provide “a context
in which to judge not the seriousness of the crime…but the extent to which
the ofender should be considered blameworthy.”51 Specifcally, some scholars
recognize the relationship between post-ofence conduct, such as remorse and
reduced culpability,52 and previous convictions and greater culpability.53 Tis
literature recognizes mitigating and aggravating factors that were traditionally
considered irrelevant since culpability strictly referred to blameworthiness during
the commission of the ofence.54 Tis new development has been referred to as
50. Dugas, supra note 13; R v Anderson, 2021 NSCA 62; R v Morris, 2021 ONCA 680.
51. Julian V Roberts, “Te Recidivist Premium: For and Against” in Andrew von Hirsch,
Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts, ed, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Teory and Policy,
3rd ed (Hart, 2009) at 155.
52. Ibid. Within this perspective, ofenders’ remorse speaks to their relation to the act for
which they are being punished. Remorseful ofenders are concerned with achieving some
rectifcation for their wrongdoing—taking a step away from their ofending and therefore
reducing the extent to which they are considered blameworthy.
53. See Julian V Roberts, “Punishing Persistence: Explaining the Enduring Appeal of the
Recidivist Sentencing Premium” (2008) 48 Brit J Crim 468 (arguing that within just-desert,
reofending is a mark of increased blameworthiness for reasons similar to premeditation,
namely the presence of a more culpable state of mind). Having already been convicted and
sentenced, an ofender should take steps to address the causes of non-compliance. Also,
having already been convicted gives, or should give, the actor increased awareness of the
wrongfulness of his behaviour when he contemplates doing this again. See also Darcy L
MacPherson, “Te Relevance of Prior Record in the Criminal Law: A Response to the Teory
of Professor von Hirsch” (2002) 28 Queen’s LJ 177; Youngjae Lee, “Recidivism as Omission:
A Relational Account” (2009) 87 Texas L Rev 571; Julian V Roberts, Punishing Persistent
Ofenders: Exploring Community and Ofender Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2008).
54. Retributivists are divided on this topic. For some, prior convictions should never be relevant
elements at sentencing since they do not relate to the specifc ofence under consideration.
See e.g. George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Company, 1978);
Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach (Cavendish, 2001).
Traditional desert-theory has assigned a very limited role to previous convictions under
the progressive loss of mitigation doctrine, which argues that frst ofenders should
receive a discounted sentence, as well as those who have had up to a certain number of
previous convictions. According to this perspective, it is only after several repetitions that
ofenders should be dealt with by the imposition of the full measure of penalty at the level
of the ceiling for the ofence. See e.g. Martin Wasik & Andrew von Hirsch, “Section 29
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“retributarianism,”55 which suggests greater individualization and an extension of
the relevant timeframe for assessing culpability.
3.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENCE (HARM)

Te second component of proportionality refers to the gravity of the ofence
and encompasses the harm related to the ofence – understood as “injury
done or risked by the act.”56 Tis component has always been a component of
desert-based proportionality, but its conceptualization evolved from an abstract
understanding to the recognition of individualized/experiential accounts.
Indeed, traditional desert theorists initially assessed this dimension of
proportionality within a more abstract analysis that refers to the typical victim.
Tey developed a framework they term the living standard approach, which
gauges levels of harm by placing them on a scale57 to assess the efect of the
typical case of particular crimes on the living standard of victims. Te framework
frst examines what interests are violated or threatened by the standard case of the
crime.58 Second, there is a quantifcation of the efect of violating those interests
on the living standards of the typical victim.59 At this stage, these quantifcations
of efect on living standards need to be transferred to a scale of harm. Within
this framework, harm refers to what is conceived as typical relating to given
ofences and is therefore not individualized. An additional step includes possible
reduction in the level of seriousness to refect the remoteness of the actual harm.
Recent conceptions of this component have evolved to recognize
individualized and experiential conceptions of harm as part of the analysis.
Tis evolution has been particularly prominent with the rise of the victim in
the criminal process. Indeed, some literature on victim impact statements (VIS)
argues that these statements advance proportionality by providing accounts of

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Revised: Previous Convictions in Sentencing” (1994) 24 Crim L Rev 409; von Hirsch &
Ashworth, supra note 20.
Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Netanel Dagan, “Retributarianism: A New Individualization of
Punishment” (2019) 13 Crim L & Philosophy 129.
von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 38 at 2.
Ibid. See also Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, supra note 39.
Tese interests are divided into four generic categories: physical integrity; material support
and amenity; freedom from humiliation or degrading treatment; and privacy and autonomy.
Efects are categorized into four levels: subsistence; minimal well-being; adequate well-being;
and signifcant enhancement.
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harm more accurately than those relating to the traditional objective standard.60
It has been argued that without a clear understanding of the impact of the
crime, a court is sentencing on the basis of the generic level of harm associated
with a legal category, resulting in a loss of proportionality and hence justice.61
Indeed, studies suggest that judges have found VIS useful to craft proportionate
sentences as the statements provide them with more information about the actual
harm sufered.62
B. UTILITARIAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPORTIONALITY

Conceptions of proportionality underpinned by utilitarianism are less developed
within the academic literature.63 Under a utilitarian perspective, sentences
may be disproportionately severe in two situations.64 Te frst, “ends benefts”
proportionality, occurs when burdens outweigh the benefts produced by the
penalty or when burdens, compared to a lesser penalty, outweigh the benefts.
Alternatively, it can be disproportionately lenient when it is less efective than
a more severe, but still cost-efective, penalty. Te second, “alternative-means”
proportionality, suggests that a sentence is disproportionately severe when there
exist less costly or burdensome means of achieving the same goals.
60. Anthony Bottoms, “Te ‘Duty to Understand’: What Consequences for Victim
Participation?” in Anthony Bottoms & Julian V Roberts, eds, Hearing the Victim: Adversarial
Justice, Crime Victims, and the State (Willan Publishing, 2010) 17; Edna Erez, “Who’s
Afraid of the Big Bad Victim?: Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and
Enhancement of Justice” (1999) Crim L Rev 545; Paul G Cassell, “In Defense of Victim
Impact Statements” (2009) 6 Ohio St J Crim L 611; Marie Manikis & Julian V Roberts,
“Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing: Te Relevance of Ancillary Harm” (2010) 15 Can
Crim L Rev 1; Marie Manikis, “Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing: Towards a Clearer
Understanding of their Aims” (2015) 65 UTLJ 85. Tis contribution and conception of
proportionality is also supported by Paul G Cassell & Edna Erez, “Victim Impact Statements
and Ancillary Harm: Te American Perspective” (2011) 15 Can Crim Law Rev 149.
61. Julian V Roberts & Marie Manikis, Victim Personal Statements: A Review of Empirical
Research (Ofce of the Commissioner for Victims of Crime and Witnesses of England and
Wales, 2011) at 9.
62. See e.g. Julian V Roberts & Allen Edgar, Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing: Judicial
Experiences and Perceptions (Department of Justice Canada, 2006) at 15 (in which judges
noted that statements were particularly useful for crimes of violence, property ofences
where the extent of loss was unclear, or cases in which the harm to the victim was unusual,
exceptional or “not clearly manifest to an objective observer”); Erez, supra note 60.
63. Richard S Frase, “Teories of Proportionality and Desert” in Joan Petersilia and Kevin
R Reitz, eds, Te Oxford Handbook of Sentencing and Corrections (Oxford University
Press, 2012) 131.
64. Richard S Frase, “Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State
Constitutions” (2008) 11 J Constitutional L 39 at 43.
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Some more recent utilitarian theories of punishment consider proportionality
a moderating principle—a ceiling requiring that a sentence not exceed what is
just and appropriate to achieve their retained utilitarian aim.65 In this sense,
proportionality is described as a brake rather than a yardstick and operates to
limit the negative efects of punishment.
“Limiting retributivism” is a form of hybrid theory that is rooted within
a consequentialist rationale. Norval Morris, its leading proponent, and other
subsequent endorsers developed theories of punishment that aim to provide
solutions to systemic criminal justice problems, including the growing size of
the prison population and the overrepresentation of racial minorities and people
with mental health issues, rather than to formulate principled and legitimizing
frameworks of punishment.66 Tis theory suggests that proportionality should set
loose upper and lower limits to ensure punishment is not contrary to community
standards and, within these limits, judges can pursue any consequence-oriented
objectives.67 Richard S. Frase recently criticized this loosely-defned limit
and suggested that proportionality should largely be a matter of retributive
considerations, with utilitarian concerns only relevant within a narrow range of
deserved sentences.68
Factors relevant to the determination of a sentence within utilitarian
conceptions depend on the chosen objective of sentencing, such as deterrence,
rehabilitation, reparation, or public protection. Factors are relevant only insofar
as they relate to limiting the harm of punishment or ensuring that the sentence
meets its objective. For instance, similar to retributive sentencing, punishment in
proportion to past harm is relevant within utilitarian theory, but only when this will
prevent future similar crimes by the ofender through deterrence, incapacitation,
and/or rehabilitation, or prevent crimes by others through deterrence and norm
reinforcement. Further, contrary to desert-based proportionality, culpability
for utilitarians is relevant only to the extent that it relates to future benefts of
the punishment—for instance, the dangerousness, rehabilitative, and deterring
possibilities for this ofender and others.
As recognized by its founder, Morris, the theoretical foundations of
consequentialist proportionality, including limiting retributivism, have
been weaker than desert-based accounts. Specifcally, unlike a desert-based
65. von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 20 at 5.
66. Manson & Torburn, supra note 19.
67. Norval Morris, Te Future of Imprisonment (Chicago University Press, 1974); Manson &
Torburn, supra note 19.
68. “Limiting Retributivism,” supra note 19.
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conception that developed frameworks for achieving ordinal proportionality,69
consequentialist conceptions of proportionality are primarily grounded in a logic
of efciency towards achieving various objectives, discussed above, but without
a clear framework of how and in what ways this can efciently be achieved with
punishment. Further, they have been concerned primarily with criminal justice
policy-making and, unlike just deserts theory, less with principled accounts
that provide justifcations for state coercion through sentencing.70 Desert-based
theorists have, in this sense, also developed frameworks to determine and justify
which factors are considered relevant to censure being commensurate to the
degree of blameworthiness that a conduct would warrant.
As a response to some of these critics, Morris’ theory was refned by
drawing on just deserts to set the outer limits of proportionate punishment.
However, theorists have continued to suggest that the framework needs to
provide more guidance on judicial discretion to pursue instrumental ends.
As Frase highlighted, a more precise formulation of the limited retributivist
model needs to be set out and “must, itself, be kept within some limits or it
ceases to have any real meaning or utility.”71 For the time being, a more precise
formulation of a predominantly consequentialist model to achieve utilitarian
goals, such as deterrence and rehabilitation, has yet to be achieved and, for many
consequentialists, keeping within the limits drawn by a desert-based perspective
risks undermining the achievement of these utilitarian goals. Tis can be seen in
the numerous judgments wherein consequentialists are tempted to ignore these
limits in order to achieve such objectives, yet still refer to proportionality. In this
sense, proportionality rooted within a consequentialist model provides much
less guidance for sentencers and is less frmly rooted in an underlying rationale.
Finally, its emphasis on a series of objectives undermines the censuring dimension
of punishment, which risks greater arbitrariness and the dangers highlighted with
consequentialism.

69. von Hirch & Ashworth, supra note 20 at 140. Te three sub-requirements proposed by
desert theorists include parity, rank-ordering, and spacing of penalties. For a desert-based
understanding of proportionality, the requirements of ordinal proportionality are not
mere limits, and they are infringed (considered disproportionate) when persons that are
similarly blameworthy for a similar conduct receive unequal sanctions on ulterior (e.g., crime
prevention) grounds.
70. Manson & Torburn, supra note 19 at 279.
71. Ibid at 295.
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II. THE EVOLVING CONCEPTION(S) OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN CANADIAN SENTENCING
Te following section examines the evolution of proportionality in Canada.
It argues that proportionality within legislation is rooted in desert. Moreover,
it suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada rooted proportionality within
desert theory and in recent years evolved, just like desert theory, to expand the
components of desert-based proportionality, namely culpability and harm. Most
recently, however, the Court has re-defned the concept of proportionality to
incorporate both desert and utilitarian approaches,72 muddling the underpinnings
of this concept. Finally, this section argues in favour of a dynamic approach to
proportionality that is rooted within a desert-based logic of punishment, where
other sentencing considerations can be integrated separately from proportionality.
A. DESERT-BASED PROPORTIONALITY IN CANADA

Te principle of proportionality has a long historical presence in Canada.
Even prior to its entrenchment as a fundamental principle of sentencing in
the Criminal Code, courts highlighted the necessity of a proportionate relation
between punishment and blameworthiness.73
In 1996, the principle of proportionality was ofcially recognized as the
fundamental principle of Canadian sentencing. Section 718.1 of the Criminal
Code specifes that all sentences must be proportional to the gravity of the ofence
and the degree of responsibility of the ofender.74 Tis incorporation was in
great part due to the infuence of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, which
produced the Report on Sentencing Reform in 1987.75
At the time this report was drafted, judges chose among diferent principles
and combined them as they saw ft, in the absence of paramount guiding principles
and objectives.76 As a response to this “amalgam approach,”77 the Sentencing
Commission relied on the work of von Hirsch, who developed just deserts
72. Sylvestre, supra note 5.
73. R v Martineau, [1990] 2 SCR 633 at 645 (proportionality between punishment and
blameworthiness was recognized as a principle of fundamental justice). Earlier, the Court of
Appeal of Ontario also alluded to the importance of “just proportion” between the crime and
the sentence by highlighting that the nature and gravity of the crime need to be taken into
account when determining a sentence. See R v Wilmott, [1966] 2 OR 654 (CA).
74. See supra note 2, s 718.1.
75. Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (Ottawa: CSC, February 1987).
76. Ibid at 58.
77. Manson, supra note 6 at 62.
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theory. Accordingly, it integrated von Hirsch’s dual desert-based components to
the principle of proportionality, which stated that “[t]he paramount principle
governing the determination of a sentence is that the sentence be proportionate
to the gravity of the ofence and the degree of responsibility of the ofender for
the ofence.”78
Although Parliament maintained the amalgam approach by avoiding
hierarchizing the objectives of sentencing, it nevertheless recognized von Hirsch’s
desert-based conception of proportionality as the fundamental principle of
sentencing in Canada.79 Tis provision, among the most explicit incorporation
of desert-based proportionality in common law, explicitly mentions von
Hirsch’s dual components of proportionality, the gravity of the ofence and the
blameworthiness of the ofender.
Te Sentencing Commission also referred to theories linking punishment to
prevention and penal censure,80 as well as the rule of law. For instance, it stated
that punishment does not serve to “deter those tempted to break the rules but
rather to maintain the rules as a set of standards that compel allegiance in spite
of violations.”81 Punishment is legitimized because it is an appropriate way of
addressing the perpetrator and society, seen as agents capable of deliberation.
Tis reasoning aligns with a desert-based communicative theory discussed above,
which suggests that despite some preventive dimension, “[a]ny positive-generalpreventive efect that such messages have would be secondary to such normative
reasons.”82 Based on these understandings, the Commission recommended that
“[i]n furtherance of the overall purpose of the criminal law of maintaining a just,
peaceful and safe society, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to preserve
the authority of and promote respect for the law through the imposition of just
sanctions.”83 Tis dimension is included in section 718 of the Criminal Code,
which highlights that the fundamental purpose of sentencing in Canada “is
to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives,
to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by
78. Canadian Sentencing Commission, supra note 75 at 154.
79. Manson, supra note 6 at 62, 76.
80. Von Hirsch’s work is cited by the Canadian Sentencing Commission, highlighting that “[h]
ad punishment no preventive value, the sufering it inficts would be unwarranted” (supra
note 75 at 131). Tis vision, however, sees censure as predominantly a tool to communicate
with moral agents.
81. Canadian Sentencing Commission, supra note 75 at 151, citing Hyman Gross, A Teory of
Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 1979) at 400-01.
82. von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 20 at 20.
83. Canadian Sentencing Commission, supra note 75 at 153.
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imposing just sanctions.”84 Tis roots the rationales of sentencing in desert and
links them to the foundational dimensions of criminal law and the rule of law.
Further evidence that the principle of proportionality is predominantly rooted
in desert theory can be found in the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation
of this legislative principle. As will be seen, it has been linked to the retributive
aims of punishment, desert, and censure, while also recognizing a restraining
dimension and linking the principle to the importance of parity.
1.

RETRIBUTIVE-BASED PROPORTIONALITY AND CENSURE

In R. v. M.(C.A.), the Court cited the Canadian Sentencing Commission’s 1987
Report on Sentencing Reform to state that a theory of retribution centred on
“just deserts” or “just sanctions” provides a helpful organizing principle for
imposing criminal sanctions.85
Placing the principle of proportionality at the centre of the discussion,
Chief Justice Lamer argued that retribution provides a relevant “conceptual link”
between criminal liability and the eventual sanction, and that proportionality
determines its measure. He justifed retribution by distinguishing it from
vengeance in the following terms:
Retribution in a criminal context, by contrast, represents an objective, reasoned
and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly refects
the moral culpability of the ofender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking
of the ofender, the consequential harm caused by the ofender, and the normative
character of the ofender’s conduct. Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution
incorporates a principle of restraint; retribution requires the imposition of a just and
appropriate punishment, and nothing more.86

In addition to linking proportionality to retribution, the Court highlighted the
importance of ensuring that the sentence imposed bears some relationship to the
ofence87 when examining desert—thus adopting the logic of ofence centrality
at the heart of desert-based proportionality. Prior to the legislative amendments,
this idea was expressed by Justice Wilson’s concurring judgment in Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act:
It is basic to any theory of punishment that the sentence imposed bear some
relationship to the ofence; it must be a “ft” sentence proportionate to the
seriousness of the ofence. Only if this is so can the public be satisfed that the
84.
85.
86.
87.

Supra note 2, s 718.
[1996] 1 SCR 500 at para 78.
Ibid at para 80.
Ibid at para 40.
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ofender “deserved” the punishment he received and feel a confdence in the fairness
and rationality of the system.88

Tis idea of a “ft” sentence is synonymous with a desert-based conception of
proportionality.
Te relationship between proportionality and retribution is also found in
the Court’s justifcation of proportionality as a principle. In a Kantian logic,
Justice Rosenberg highlighted that “[c]areful adherence to the proportionality
principle ensures that th[e] ofender is not unjustly dealt with for the sake of the
common good”89—a statement supported by the Supreme Court of Canada.90
Proportionality is therefore rooted in retributive desert considerations rather than
on consequentialist underlying theories of punishment.
Te Court echoed desert theory throughout the years by holding that
punishments must be sufciently afictive to enable censure, but no more
than necessary to speak out against the ofence and the ofender’s level of
blameworthiness.91 It links just deserts to sentencing as a form of judicial and
social censure, referring to works by desert theorists to highlight this as their
rationale92 and its restraining function.93
Tis dual dimension of desert is also featured in R. v. Ipeelee,94 in which Justice
Lebel describes proportionality as linked to the objective of denunciation—
related to desert theory’s notion of censure—and the restraining component, tied
to the ofender’s moral blameworthiness.
88. [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 533 [BC Motor Vehicle Act].
89. R v Priest (1996), 10 CCC (3d) 289 at 297-98 (Ont CA).
90. R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para 128 [Lacasse]. Tis case relates to an ofence of impaired
driving causing death and discusses whether it was open to the trial judge to consider the
frequency of impaired driving in a region where the ofence was committed as a relevant
factor. As part of this analysis, it examines proportionality (ibid at para 13).
91. R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at para 42 [Nasogaluak]; Lacasse, supra note 90 at paras 12,
123, 154, Gascon J, dissenting. See also R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para 75 [Friesen], citing
Nasogaluak, supra note 91 at para 42 (confrming that proportionality serves its function of
“ensur[ing] that ofenders are held responsible for their actions and that the sentence properly
refects and condemns their role in the ofence and the harm they caused”).
92. Nasogaluak, supra note 91 at para 42, citing Julian V Roberts & David P Cole, “Introduction
to Sentencing and Parole” in Julian V Roberts & David P Cole, eds, Making Sense of
Sentencing (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 3 at 10.
93. Nasogaluak, supra note 91 at para 42.
94. 2012 SCC 13 [Ipeelee]. In this case, two Indigenous ofenders with long-term supervision
orders (LTSO) for committing ofences while intoxicated were sentenced to imprisonment
for breaching conditions in the LTSO. Tey had addictions to drugs and alcohol and a
history of committing sexual assaults when intoxicated. Te Court had to decide how to
determine a ft sentence for a breach of an LTSO in the case of an Indigenous ofender.
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Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle ensures that
a sentence refects the gravity of the ofence. Tis is closely tied to the objective of
denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confdence in the
justice system....Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does
not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the ofender. In
this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice
for the ofender. In the Canadian criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that
refects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense
of the other.95

Curiously, the Court divides proportionality into a dual function: Te principle
either promotes justice for victims and ensures public confdence or ensures
justice for the ofender. Tis division supposes that victims and the public share
interests, which are inherently diferent from those held by the ofender. Tis
logic is questionable since victimization, ofenders, and the public confdence
are interrelated. More often than not, these actors share similar interests in
just sanctions.96 Further, the Court also seems to suggest that the restraining
dimension of proportionality only relates to the moral blameworthiness of the
ofender but not the gravity of the ofence, departing from just deserts theory.
Further, the Court has drawn important links between proportionality
and parity—a crucial component of desert-based sentencing. It has long held
that similar ofenders who commit similar ofences in similar circumstances
should receive similar sentences, and that parity and proportionality are not in
tension.97 In Friesen,98 the Court recently recognized that “parity is an expression
of proportionality” and “[a] consistent application of proportionality will lead to
parity.”99 Tis highlights that proportionality can be individualized to attend to
individual dimensions of the ofender, an argument that is increasingly permeating
desert-based theory. As highlighted by the Court in Lacasse, “[i]ndividualization
and parity of sentences must be reconciled for a sentence to be proportionate.”100
Finally, as will be seen below, the Supreme Court of Canada has also rooted
proportionality within desert theory by considering factors that relate to its dual
components: the gravity of the ofence and degrees of culpability.

95. Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 37.
96. Marie Manikis, “A New Model of the Criminal Justice Process: Victims’ Rights as Advancing
Penal Parsimony and Moderation” (2019) 30 Crim LF 201.
97. R v Pham, 2013 SCC 15 at para 9 [Pham]; R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14 at para
68; Lacasse, supra note 90 at para 53.
98. Friesen, supra note 91.
99. Ibid at para 32.
100. Lacasse, supra note 90 para 53.
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2.

A COMMITMENT TO THE DUAL COMPONENTS OF JUST DESERTS AND
THE EXCLUSION OF EXTRANEOUS FACTORS FROM THE CONCEPT OF
PROPORTIONALITY

Te Supreme Court of Canada relied on desert-based proportionality by
underscoring its equal commitment to both the gravity of the ofence and
blameworthiness of the ofender. For instance, in R. v. Proulx, the Court
highlighted that the presumptive exclusion of certain ofences from the
conditional sentencing regime on the basis of proportionality misconstrues the
nature of this principle, because this inordinately focuses on the gravity of the
ofence and insufciently on moral blameworthiness.101 More recently, in Ipeelee
and Lacasse, the Court reiterated this dual and equal commitment to both
components of proportionality.102
In earlier decisions, in addition to reafrming the importance of both
components, the Court held that factors unrelated to these dual components,
such as time spent in pre-sentence custody and the collateral efects of a
sentence, are irrelevant to proportionality, but can be taken into account in the
overall punishment.
Tis approach to proportionality is seen in early cases that followed the
codifcation of proportionality, including Proulx103 and R. v. Fice.104 For instance,
when discussing conditional sentences and whether time spent in pre-sentence
custody are relevant to the overall sentence, the Court applied its reasoning from
Wust105 to conclude that although time spent in pre-sentence custody needs
to be considered within the total punishment, it is not a mitigating factor that
can afect the range of sentence and the availability of a conditional sentence.
According to the Court, “[t]his makes sense because the appropriate range of
sentence is related to the gravity of the ofence or the moral blameworthiness of
the ofender, and these concepts do not change with the time spent in pre-sentence
custody.”106 Tis approach maps onto Ashworth’s view of “extraneous” factors,107
according to which only factors related to harm and blameworthiness are relevant
to proportionality.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

R v Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para 83 [Proulx].
Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 36; Lacasse, supra note 90 at para 53.
Supra note 101.
2005 SCC 32 [Fice].
Fice, supra note 104 at para 21, citing R v Wust, 2000 SCC 18 at para 41.
Fice, supra note 104 at para 22.
Ashworth, “Aggravation and Mitigation,” supra note 2 at 25.
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More recently, the Court took a similar view of desert-based proportionality
in Pham.108 In this case, an accused without citizenship was convicted of
drug-related ofences and would face the loss of his right to appeal a removal
order against him under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) if
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least two years. Te Court had to
determine whether a sentence can be varied on the basis that the ofender would
face collateral consequences under the IRPA. It made clear that aggravating
and mitigating factors should pertain to the dual components of desert-based
proportionality. Indeed, in the words of the Court, some personal circumstances
of the ofender, such as the collateral consequences of a sentence “are not, strictly
speaking, aggravating or mitigating factors, since such factors are by defnition
related only to the gravity of the ofence or to the degree of responsibility of the
ofender (s. 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code).”109
Te Court maintained that collateral consequences of a sentence can
remain relevant to the overall sentence, but only when they are justifed by
reference to other principles, such as individualization and parity, or objectives of
rehabilitation.110 Tis resonates with desert theory’s concept of extraneous factors.
Within this framework, a distinction between the proportionate aspect of
sentences and other aspects is therefore needed to determine which factors can
be taken into account as part of a proportionate sentence, and which additional
factors can be relevant in the overall sentence but are separate from proportionality
(because they rest on diferent underlying rationales). Indeed, a distinction can
be made between mitigating factors and factors that can reduce the sentence
on diferent underlying theories. Mitigating factors, according to desert-based
proportionality, refer only to factors that are relevant to the gravity of the
ofence and blameworthiness yet external to proportionality, such as collateral
efects and time spent in pre-trial detention, which may be relevant to craft “ft”
sentences. Terefore, as will be discussed in Part III(A), below, ftness should
not be used interchangeably with proportionality. Terminology is important to
root concepts within principled rationales, which in turn afect the relevance of
factors in sentencing.
While the Court initially adopted a desert-based understanding of
proportionality, it evolved to ofer a new conception of proportionality that is
difcult to reconcile with its previous iterations about the gravity of the ofence
and blameworthiness as the relevant elements of proportionality. Part II(C) will
108. See supra note 97.
109. Ibid at para 11.
110. Ibid. See also R v Suter, 2018 SCC 34 at para 48 [Suter].
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explore the ways that the Court has increasingly rooted proportionality within
consequentialist rationales.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF RETRIBUTIVE-BASED PROPORTIONALITY: THE
EXPANSION OF CULPABILITY, HARM, AND PUNISHMENT

In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the dual components of
proportionality by relying on evolving understandings of culpability, harm, and
punishment. Consideration of the evolving knowledge on culpability (blame)
and harm suggests that desert-based proportionality has the potential to evolve
in a principled manner. As discussed below, the Court’s evolving understanding
of culpability and harm parallels some of the evolution in desert-based theory.
1.

THE EVOLVING CONCEPTION OF CULPABILITY/BLAMEWORTHINESS

In Ipeelee, the Court recognized the importance of assessing culpability within
a desert-based framework of proportionality. It provided interpretative remarks
on factors relevant to understanding culpability within the context of sentencing
Indigenous ofenders under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.
Despite its emphasis on the various objectives and conceptions of
proportionality in Ipeelee, the Court rooted in part the R. v. Gladue111
methodology under 718.2(e) within a desert-based understanding of
proportionality. Te Gladue methodology instructs judges to take into account:
(1) the unique systemic and background factors which may have played a part
in bringing the Indigenous ofender before the courts; and (2) the types of
sentencing procedures and sanctions potentially appropriate in the circumstances
for the ofender in light of their particular Indigenous heritage.112
In Ipeelee, the Court specifed that systemic and background factors can
be relevant mitigating factors, because they may explain in part the Indigenous
ofender’s conduct.113 Indeed, it argued that “systemic and background factors
111. [1999] 1 SCR 688 [Gladue]. In Gladue, an Indigenous woman pled guilty to manslaughter
for killing her partner who was having an extramarital afair with her sister. Tis was a
seminal decision that interpreted section 718.2(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code, which
requires sentencers to pay particular attention to the circumstances of Indigenous ofenders
and to consider all available sanctions other than imprisonment, including restorative and
Indigenous approaches to sentencing. Ipeelee is a complementary decision that provides
further guidance.
112. Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 72.
113. Ibid at para 73; R v Wells, 2000 SCC 10 at para 38 [Wells]. Te Court refers to desert-based
proportionality such that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the ofence as
well as the degree of responsibility of the ofender.
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may bear on the culpability of the ofender, to the extent that they shed light on
his or her level of moral blameworthiness.”114 Te Court echoes traditional desert
theory by referring to voluntariness, an aspect of criminal liability. It suggests that
while socio-economic deprivation faced by many Indigenous ofenders rarely—if
ever—attains a level whereby their actions could be considered involuntary and
therefore undeserving of criminal sanctions, it can nonetheless be said that their
circumstances may diminish their moral culpability. Te language of desert used
by the Court suggests a desert-based understanding of culpability.
Although traditional desert theory has resisted linking volition,
socio-economic deprivation, and culpability, the Court followed desert theory’s
increasing openness to external knowledge about the relationship between
volition and culpability. Indeed, there is recognition among desert theorists that
moral volition varies in degree, which can be integrated in our understanding of
culpability. Remaining in desert-based understandings, by explicitly referring to
criminal liability’s premise which follows from voluntary conduct that is deserving
of criminal sanctions, as well as recognizing degrees of diminished moral blame,
the Court nevertheless employs a more fexible evidential standard to link social
deprivation and volition in the context of Indigenous ofenders. Departing
from traditional desert theory, the Court makes clear that a causal link between
background factors and the ofence is not required.115 Te Court also makes clear
that systemic and background factors do not operate as an excuse or justifcation
for the ofence but provide context that can bear on the ofender’s culpability. Te
Court’s position refects an increasing recognition that socio-economic factors
afect volition, even if this remains difcult to prove with causal certainty.
2.

THE EVOLVING CONCEPTION OF HARM/GRAVITY OF THE OFFENCE

Te Supreme Court of Canada also addressed the harm/gravity dimension of
proportionality. While it limited its importance in the context of Indigenous
ofenders in Ipeelee, it made this aspect prominent in Friesen116 for sexual
violence against children, accounting for society’s contemporary understanding
of the gravity of this form of violence. Te recent rise of VIS also contributed to
a re-conceptualization of harm that is more subjective and experiential, similar to
the evolution in desert-based theory.
114. Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 73.
115. Ibid at para 81.
116. Tis case involves sexual assault against a young person and whether an error of law or a
demonstrably unft sentence was rendered when relying on the starting point for sexual
ofences towards youth. Friesen, supra note 91 at paras 2-3.
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In the context of sentencing Indigenous ofenders, Gladue highlights the
importance of desert-based proportionality by specifying that “[g]enerally, the
more violent and serious the ofence the more likely it is as a practical reality
that the terms of imprisonment for aboriginals and non-aboriginals will be close
to each other or the same, even taking into account their diferent concepts of
sentencing.”117 Terefore, from a desert-based perspective, the seriousness of the
ofence would be weighed along with the culpability of the ofender, including
background and systemic factors.118 Tis might give rise to a situation where
sentences for more serious ofences will be closer to the ones for ofenders who do
not have the mitigating elements that relate to the background factors discussed
in Gladue and Ipeelee. If mitigating elements exist, such as those that relate to
the socio-economic context that can afect blame, this would be relevant in the
assessment of proportionality.119 Arguably, the Court had this in mind in Gladue,
which does not mean that the consideration of background under section
718.2(e) is not to be taken into account.
Surprisingly, in Ipeelee, the Court treated the notion of ofence seriousness
invoked in Gladue as a foreign concept in Canadian sentencing. Te Court
referred to an article that suggests that in the absence of either a legal test to
determine what is considered “serious” and a distinction between serious and
non-serious crimes in the Code, it can be said that statutorily speaking, there is
no such thing as a “serious” ofence.120 Tis afrmation is curious for a Court that
has relied on desert-based proportionality and levels of ofence gravity, examining
the relative seriousness of ofences as part of its analysis. Further, the Criminal
Code refers to gravity in its defnition of proportionality under section 718.1,
and several provisions note that ofence seriousness is an important dimension

117. Supra note 111 at para 79; Wells, supra note 113 at paras 42-44.
118. As highlighted by Justice Iacobucci, the sentencing judge must also look to the circumstances
of the Indigenous ofender, which include factors that relate to moral blameworthiness. See
Wells, supra note 113 at para 38.
119. In recent years, Gladue reports have been helpful in ofering additional context that allow
for a greater understanding of blameworthiness. However, when tied to consequentialist
aims, such as reducing crime rates by imposing sentences that efectively deter criminality
and rehabilitate ofenders, these aims have not been met. Instead, they have been used as risk
assessment tools that illustrate the risk of reofending and have undermined eforts to reduce
the over-incarceration of Indigenous people, contributing to discriminatory practices and
decisions. See Constance MacIntosh & Gillian Angrove, “Developments in Aboriginal Law:
Te 2011-2012 Term – Charter Rights, Constitutional Rights, Taxation and Sentencing”
(2012) 59 SCLR 1.
120. Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 86.
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of sentencing.121 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada referred to this
notion in various criminal justice contexts, including in decisions that engage
with proportionality.122 Instead of suggesting that ordinal ranking does not exist
and avoiding this concept in Gladue, sentencing law would have benefted from
additional clarifcation on ofence seriousness.
Te evolving notion of ofence gravity as an important dimension of
proportionality is discussed in Friesen.123 Tis case involved sexual assault against
a young person and whether an error of law or a demonstrably unft sentence was
rendered when relying on the starting point for sexual ofences towards youth.
Accordingly, the Court had to assess ofence gravity and posited that the concept
of harm may evolve with society’s understanding or with new knowledge that
exposes biases and myths surrounding specifc harms. Te Court emphasized that
the concept of gravity in proportionality must not only consider physical but also
emotional and psychological harm.124
Moreover, like the evolution of desert theory, the Court clarifed that the
inherent harm to the ofence is insufcient when examining harm. Sentences
need to refect the gravity of the ofence, as well as the consequential harm to
children and their families, caregivers, and communities, and the experiential
harm sufered by victims. Tis resonates with the literature on VIS from a
desert-based perspective, which recognizes the importance of ancillary harm and
lived experiences in the calibration of the harm dimension of proportionality.
C. AN EVOLUTION TOWARDS CONSEQUENTIALIST CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE INCLUSION OF EXTRANEOUS FACTORS

While the retributive and desert-based foundations of proportionality remain
strong in Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently begun to infuse
its judgments with consequentialist views of proportionality that confict with
its desert-based conception. Tis increasing multiplication of meanings of
proportionality has given rise to a situation where factors previously considered
extraneous to proportionality are now being considered within its defnition. Tis

121. For instance, the Criminal Code as well as the Youth Criminal Justice Act defne serious
ofences in relation to the sentence. See Criminal Code, supra note 2, ss 2, 467.1(1);
Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002 c 1, s 2. Tis is also the case between summary and
indictable ofences.
122. See e.g. BC Motor Vehicle Act, supra note 88 at 533; Friesen, supra note 91 at para 79;
R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para 62; Suter, supra note 110 at para 81.
123. Friesen, supra note 91 at para 79.
124. Ibid at paras 76-86.
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can be seen in several recent judgments, including Ipeelee, Lacasse, Nasogaluak,
Pham, and Suter.
1.

IPEELEE, LACASSE, AND THE MULTIPLE UNDERPINNINGS OF
PROPORTIONALITY

As seen above, the Court in Ipeelee and Lacasse interprets proportionality within
the dual elements of just deserts. Despite its commitment to this conception,
the Court refers to ideas antithetical to this rationale in the same judgement.
For instance, it stated that “[w]hatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the
various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting sentence
must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality.”125 If the fundamental
principle of proportionality is understood as the gravity of the ofence and the
level of blameworthiness of the ofender, it is difcult to conceptualize how
it could both be rooted in other objectives and remain proportionate. In this
sense, as will be developed below, a sentence that takes into account extraneous
factors that relate to objectives that are not rooted in desert, can be considered ft,
if justifed and proven efcient, but disproportionate.
Similarly, in its discussion of the breach of long-term supervision order in
Ipeelee, the Court stated that
[a]s with any sentencing decision, the relative weight to be accorded to each
sentencing principle or objective will vary depending on the circumstances of the
particular ofence. In all instances, the sentence must be proportionate to both the
gravity of the ofence and the degree of responsibility of the ofender.126

Tis confuses the analysis: On the one hand, the Court defnes proportionality by
alluding to its dual desert-based components, yet, on the other, it invites judges
to include unrelated objectives.
It thus appears that desert-based components can be set aside to prioritize
various consequentialist objectives, but as will be seen below, this would limit
the individual censuring dimension of proportionality and its expression of
individual blame. Tis version of proportionality departs from even the most
fexible conceptions of retributive (or deserts) accounts as it ofers a primary role
to consequentialist underpinnings.

125. Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 37; Lacasse, supra note 90 at para 154.
126. Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 51.
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2.

NASOGALUAK: PROPORTIONALITY ROOTED IN CONSEQUENTIALIST
CONCEPTIONS OF EXPRESSION AND CENSURE

Nasogaluak considered unwarranted and excessive use of police force during an
arrest. In this case, a defendant pled guilty to charges of impaired driving and
feeing the police. Te Court held that the excessive use of police force was a
constitutional violation of the defendants’ rights under section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that a reduction in sentence was an appropriate
remedy for a rights violation under section 24(1). Te Court further suggested
that in circumstances where the state acted egregiously with serious efects for the
ofender, conventional sentencing principles impel a sentence reduction, even if
not considered a Charter violation.127
Te Court anchored its reasoning about the reduction of sentence in
proportionality. Similarly to Ipeelee, the Court frst anchored proportionality
within just deserts by positing that proportionality requires that sentences not
exceed what is appropriate given the moral blameworthiness of the ofender and
the gravity of the ofence.128 Linking proportionality to desert, the Court referred
to works by desert theorists in its explanation of sentencing as a form of judicial
and social censure.129
Despite this, the Court suggested that state misconduct needs to be accounted
for in sentencing because of the expressive component of proportionality. Te
Court’s reasoning mixes three separate ideas: the expressive censuring function
of desert; the purpose of sentencing as contributing to respect for the rule of law
under section 718; and an expression of censure about the action of state actors.
Yet, desert-based proportionality and section 718 of the Code are rooted in a
shared premise that sentences must be tailored to censure the blameworthiness of
the ofender and not that of state actors.
A sentencing theory that incorporates state responsibility within its censuring
dimension of the sentence is premised on diferent rationales than the provisions
to which the Court refers. Tis conception of censure could be linked to R.A.
Duf’s moral standing theory,130 which recognizes that the state’s moral authority
to condemn and punish is weakened by its own faults. However, for Duf this
expressive theory provides grounds for questioning the state’s authority to punish,
rather than a sentence reduction on that basis. Victor Tadros’s theory provides

127.
128.
129.
130.

Nasogaluak, supra note 91 at paras 6-7, 14.
Ibid at para 42.
Nasogaluak, supra note 91 at para 40-42, citing Roberts & Cole, supra note 92 at 10.
Duf, Punishment, Communication, and Community, supra note 29 at 184.
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ground for preserving the state’s legitimacy to punish while also recognizing the
communicative value of ascribing responsibility to the state.131
It is worth reiterating that the legislator defned proportionality within desert
theory to include two components, the gravity of the ofence and the level of
blameworthiness of the ofender, and that this was often reiterated by the Court.
For example, even in Nasogaluak, the Court highlights that “[f ]actors unrelated
to the ofence and to the ofender will remain irrelevant to the sentencing
process and will have to be addressed elsewhere.”132 Tus, it appears incoherent
with this conception, underpinned by a censure-based framework, to include
state misconduct as a factor of proportionality, because it is unrelated to the
two relevant components.133 Te Court’s widening of the expressive function
of sentencing to include censuring state liability suggests that proportionality
is underpinned by a utilitarian aim of censuring the state, which cannot also
adequately refect a desert-based conception.
3.

PHAM AND SUTER: EXPANDING THE MEANING AND FACTORS OF
PROPORTIONALITY TO REACH SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

In Pham, the Court had to determine whether it would reduce the ofender’s
two-year imprisonment sentence to account for the collateral consequences of
this sentence on his immigration status. Under the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, a non-citizen sentenced to a term of at least two years loses the
right to appeal a removal order against them.134
While the Court adopted a desert-based reasoning to highlight those
collateral consequences of the sentence are not mitigating or aggravating factors,
it proceeded by using utilitarian rationales to consider the collateral factors as a
relevant part of the sentence. Indeed, in numerous passages, it highlighted that
the sentence could vary under proportionality in order to “avoid the impact of
collateral immigration consequences on the ofender.”135 Tis suggests that a
proportionate sentence can be tailored to reach particular objectives.
131. Victor Tadros, “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility” (2009) 43 J Value Inquiry 391.
132. Nasogaluak, supra note 91 at para 63.
133. Benjamin L Berger, “Sentencing and the Salience of Pain and Hope” in Dwight Newman &
Malcolm Torburn, eds, Te Dignity of Law: Te Legacy of Justice Louis LeBel (LexisNexis,
2015) 337 at 344. Tis highlights that “police misconduct in the course of making an arrest
does not bear on the gravity of the ofence (…) nor does it alter his degree of responsibility
for the impaired driving or fight from the police, both of which occurred before the police
misconduct” (ibid).
134. Pham, supra note 97 at paras 1-2.
135. Ibid at paras 20, 18.
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Further, the Court specifes:
Te general rule continues to be that a sentence must be ft having regard to the
particular crime and the particular ofender. In other words, a sentencing judge
may exercise his or her discretion to take collateral immigration consequences into
account, provided that the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to
the gravity of the ofence and the degree of responsibility of the ofender.136

Tis suggests that its understanding of proportionality is rooted in multiple
conceptions. First it employs the default position that roots proportionality in
desert by suggesting that a sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the ofence
and blameworthiness, but then it proceeds to suggest that sentences may account
for the collateral immigration consequences and remain proportionate. Te latter
dimension of proportionality is rooted in consequentialism, as the sentence is
adjusted to serve a specifc objective.
Similar conceptions of proportionality are featured in additional
statements such as:
[W]here a sentence is varied to avoid collateral consequences, the further the varied
sentence is from the range of otherwise appropriate sentences, the less likely it is that
it will remain proportionate to the gravity of the ofence and the responsibility of
the ofender. Conversely, the closer the varied sentence is to the range of otherwise
appropriate sentences, the more probable it is that the reduced sentence will remain
proportionate, and thus reasonable and appropriate.137

Te Court also adds that a judge may conclude that even a minimal reduction of
sentence would render it inappropriate in light of the gravity of the ofence and
the ofender’s blameworthiness.
Tis statement again refects the two conceptions of proportionality
discussed above, which are difcult to reconcile with one another while meeting
their underlying purposes and remaining a helpful guiding principle. Te frst
conception is the default position that relies on the gravity of the ofence and the
level of blameworthiness to determine proportionality, seemingly understood as
a sentencing range.138 Te second suggests that outside the range of desert-based
proportionality, a sentence can nevertheless remain proportionate, including
136. Ibid at para 14.
137. Ibid at para 18, 20. See also ibid para 14 (highlighting a similar contradiction, namely
that “a sentencing judge may exercise his or her discretion to take collateral immigration
consequences into account, provided that the sentence that is ultimately imposed is
proportionate to the gravity of the ofence and the degree of responsibility of the ofender”).
138. Although the Court seems to equate sentencing ranges in Canada to desert-based
proportionality, this issue is not directly explored in this article and will be left
for another day.
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in situations where it is relevant to consider collateral consequences as part
of the sentence. Tis highlights that the main conception of proportionality
is desert-based, but the sentence can nevertheless be tailored to meet a
specifc objective.
According to the Court, a sentence may cease to be proportionate if the
consideration of this factor departs too much from desert-based proportionality.
However, no indications are provided on how to measure the closeness to
proportionality and when a sentence ceases to be proportionate. Questions also
remain about which collateral consequences can be deemed relevant to this
sentencing calibration.
In Suter,139 an ofender was severely beaten by a vigilante prior to his arrest
and requested a sentencing reduction partly on this basis. Like in Pham, the
Court referred to a default desert conception of proportionality, holding
that “the fundamental principle of proportionality must prevail in every
case—collateral consequences cannot be used to reduce a sentence to a point
where the sentence becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the ofence or
the moral blameworthiness of the ofender.”140 Nevertheless, the Court also
used a consequentialist conception when it stated that “[e]xamining collateral
consequences enables a sentencing judge to craft a proportionate sentence in a
given case by taking into account all the relevant circumstances related to the
ofence and the ofender.”141 Tis conceptualization of proportionality hinges on
consequentialist grounds as it aims to minimize the hardship on the ofender.

III. TOWARDS A CLEARER GROUNDING OF
PROPORTIONALITY: THE NEED FOR A COHERENT
UNDERLYING RATIONALE
An amalgam approach to sentencing recognizes that there is not one objective
that is more important than the other. Teir weight will depend on the
particular circumstances of the ofence and the ofender. In Canada, although
sentencing may serve several objectives, Parliament conceived the principle of
proportionality as the fundamental principle of sentencing under section 718.1,
and as desert-based by focusing on the dual components of desert, namely
the gravity of the ofence and the degree of responsibility of the ofender. Tis
conception is rooted in desert-based theory that considers individual censure to
139. Suter, supra note 110.
140. Ibid at para 56.
141. Ibid at para 46 [emphasis in original].
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be the driving element of proportionality, and its purpose to be communicating
the ofender’s blame for the ofence. As explained by von Hirsch and Ashworth,
“treat[ing] desert as providing only limits in the manner Morris proposes,
would disregard the censuring implications of punishment”142 and therefore
the communicative dimension of proportionality would be trumped by a series
of other considerations, mainly determined by risk. Tis central dimension of
proportionality would be undermined and the principle itself would cease to be
a useful guide in the absence of a clear theoretical underpinning.
With a coherent underlying rationale, the signal communicated is coherent,
and any additional underpinnings refected in a sentence can be considered
separately as part of a diferent analysis, outside of proportionality, that allows
additional considerations only if they are carefully justifed and proven to meet
their purported objectives (with guidance from a framework conceived outside
of proportionality). Tis approach would suggest that certain consequentialist
objectives of sentencing might need to be reconsidered143 because they are not
adequately justifed or efcient within the process, while those that remain can be
further developed with clear guidance (the specifc substance of which is beyond
the scope of this article).
In contrast, the suggestion that proportionality needs to include objectives
and factors unrelated to the dual components raises principled and methodological
questions, especially when this logic is present in the same judgment, which risks
conficting with the communicative and censuring logic behind desert. Rooting
proportionality within several underlying foundations creates various conceptions
of proportionality—rendering the principle efectively meaningless and unhelpful,
while weakening the just censuring role of proportionality. Moreover, rooting
proportionality within multiple consequentialist considerations would suggest
that the principle could mean diferent things depending on its purported aim
and be used to attain multiple and inconsistent end results.
A desert-based approach to proportionality should be dynamic, while
remaining grounded in a consistent rationale. Indeed, as highlighted in Part II(A)
(2), desert theory has evolved to include experiential understandings, scientifc
developments, and community values. Tis evolving framework is concerned with

142. Supra note 20 at 139.
143. Tis can be the case for the objective of deterrence, which many studies have shown does not
meet its purported objectives. See e.g. Anthony N Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, “Sentence
Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis” (2003) 10 Crime & Just 143.
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the state’s justifcation of the use of coercive power over an individual, remaining
consistent within an internal underlying theory that values individual censure.144
A. PROPORTIONALITY AND FITNESS AS DISTINCT CONCEPTS

Just deserts theorists, such as Ashworth (discussed above), recognize contexts in
which the calibration of a sentence requires a departure from proportionality,
and where the consideration of “extraneous factors” that are rooted within
consequential objectives can be justifed.145
Building on this idea, this part proposes conceptual nuances that understand
proportionality as dynamic and separate from “extraneous” considerations,
while dividing “extraneous” considerations into two separate concepts: “ftness”
and “external.”
One way to achieve the nuances that would complement desert theory would
be to introduce the concept of “ftness”—represented in Figure 1, below—as
distinct from proportionality (A). Fit sentences would refer to situations where
it would be justifed and proven to be efective to consider factors outside of
desert-based proportionality as part of the overall sentence (B). Tese include
contexts where a punitive approach remains relevant and when the state has
legitimacy to punish. Factors that are extraneous to proportionality, such as time
spent in pre-trial detention or collateral consequences of punishment, may be
relevant for a ft sentence but would feature separately from proportionality. Tis
framework would allow for a separate analysis of proportionality rooted within
clearer and more fexible desert-based grounds. Most importantly, it would enable
the individual censuring/communicative dimension of the sentence to remain
clear and intact as part of the initial step. Te proportionate sentence could be
provisional and clearly articulated with reasons within judgments. In the event
that there are additional objectives and factors proven to achieve their purported
aims, which can be justifed, then a ft sentence that takes into account those
additional elements can be determined.
Finally, “external” (C) would refer to considerations and factors that are
unrelated to any objectives of sentencing or best addressed in systems outside of
the criminal process, either due to the irrelevance and inefciency of a punitive
response, or because the state has lost its legitimacy to punish. Tese two
dimensions will be examined in Part III(C), below.

144. Manson & Torburn, supra note 19; Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice,
supra note 39.
145. Ashworth, “Aggravation and Mitigation,” supra note 2 at 25.
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FIGURE 1: CONCEPTS FOR SENTENCING CALIBRATION

(C) External
(B) Fitness

(A) Proportionality

To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has employed the terms “ftness,”
“appropriateness,” and “proportionate” interchangeably, albeit seemingly rooting
them in diferent rationales. In Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,146 a “ft” sentence
was considered proportionate to the seriousness of the ofence rooted in desert
theory. Similarly, in Lacasse, the Court highlighted that “proportionality is the
cardinal principle that must guide appellate courts in considering the ftness of a
sentence imposed on the ofender.”147 However, since the Court started rooting
proportionality in both desert-based and consequentialist rationales, the meaning
of ftness has become less consistent.
For instance, in Pham, the term “ftness” seemingly refers to a desert-based
sentencing range and to a wider consequentialist conception, as discussed above.
Similarly, in Nasogaluak, the Court highlights that a sentence falling outside the
regular range of appropriate sentences is not necessarily unft, stating that “a
sentencing judge may take into account police violence or other state misconduct
while crafting a ft and proportionate sentence.”148 Tis equates ftness to both
desert-based and consequentialist conceptions, suggesting that sentences within a
desert-based range are ft, but sentences outside the range may also be ft.
Tis equivalency between ftness and proportionality rooted in both desert
and consequentialism is also seen in Ipeelee, where the Court refers to Re B.C. Motor
Vehicle Act to suggest that ftness equates with desert-based proportionality.149
146.
147.
148.
149.

Supra note 88 at 533.
Supra note 90 at para 12.
Supra note 91 at para 55.
Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 37, citing BC Motor Vehicle Act, supra note 88 at 533.
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It also uses the terms “appropriate,” “proper,” “proportionate,” and “ftness”
interchangeably and links them to the importance of considering Gladue to craft
a ft and consistent sentence with fundamental principles of proportionality.150
Te consideration of Gladue includes an evolving conception of desert-based
proportionality, but also consequentialist views of proportionality. In this sense,
“ftness” is linked to various conceptions of proportionality, which runs the risk
of making it analytically confusing and meaningless.
Te proposed concepts introduced in Figure 1, above, can be useful on an
analytical level to distinguish between the rationales and purposes of sentencing.
In the Canadian context, these nuances can provide greater analytical clarity
to sentencers, who have used the terminology of proportionality and ftness
interchangeably, without a clear underpinning. On a more methodological level,
these conceptual nuances can be integrated within the structure of sentencing
guidelines, as discussed below, to provide sentencers with separate analytical
tools that distinguish between: (1) considerations and factors that are relevant to
proportionality understood as individual censure; (2) considerations and factors
that can render the sentence ft if justifed under diferent legitimate grounds that
efciently attain their aims; and (3) considerations and factors that would render
the sentence disproportionate and unft, which must therefore be discarded
from sentencing.
B. A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK THAT GROUNDS PROPORTIONALITY
IN A CLEARER DESERT-BASED CONCEPTION AND ANALYSES
EXTRANEOUS DIMENSIONS SEPARATELY

A methodology that distinguishes between desert-based factors that relate to
proportionality and other relevant factors rooted in consequentialism as part of
the overall sentence can partially be found in England and Wales’s sentencing
guidelines.151 In this jurisdiction, the Sentencing Council of England and Wales

150. Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 87.
151. See e.g. Sentencing Council, “Robbery: Defnitive Guideline” (1 April 2016), online (pdf ):
<www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Robbery-defnitive-guideline-Web.pdf>
[perma.cc/2G6B-P6KA] [Robbery Guideline].
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(Council)152 issues guidelines on sentencing, which the courts must follow unless
there are specifc justifed reasons not to do so. Sentencing guidelines are available
for a wide range of ofences, and the Council also produces overarching guidelines
on general sentencing issues and principles.
Te structure of the ofence-specifc guidelines is unique as it follows specifc
steps and provides guidance on factors that the court should take into account in
sentencing. Te frst two steps are the most critical as they set out the diferent
levels of sentence based on the harm and the blameworthiness of the ofender.
Tese preliminary steps focus on a desert-based proportionate sentence, and
generally each ofence has been stratifed into categories of seriousness with ranges
and starting-point sentences for each category. Te resulting sentence is referred
to as the provisional sentence, which is heavily rooted in individual desert.
Specifcally, step one of these guidelines lists factors exclusively relevant to
the determination of a proportionate sentence, namely factors pertaining to
harm and culpability, which are closer to a traditional desert framework that
is focused on the ofence.153 Step two completes this analysis by fne-tuning
the provisional sentence, calibrating harm and culpability by referring to a list
of non-exhaustive factors related to a more fexible desert-based conception of
proportionality, such as remorse, age, and mental disorder. Nevertheless, step
two does not entirely conform to the proposed framework as some factors are
underpinned by consequentialism.154
Te remaining factors (steps three, four, et cetera) mainly relate to crafting an
overall ft sentence, as distinct from a proportionate one. Specifcally, from step
three onwards, they acknowledge the possibility of taking into account utilitarian
factors, such as remand time, dangerousness, and assistance to the prosecution.

152. Sentencing Council, “About Us” (n.d.), online: <www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/
sentencing-and-the-council/about-the-sentencing-council> [perma.cc/4YYZ-J88W]. Te
Council was set up in 2010 to promote greater transparency and consistency in sentencing,
while maintaining judicial independence. Guidelines in England and Wales refect in great
part desert-based proportionality by scaling punishments within a community conception of
levels of severity and expert approaches to experiential understanding of punishment. Tis
difers from starting points or sentencing ranges that exist in certain countries, including
Canada, where conceptions of punishment are articulated by judges.
153. Robbery Guideline, supra note 151 at 4.
154. Ibid at 5. Factors such as serious medical conditions and sole or primary carer for dependant
relatives are arguably rooted within consequentialist rationales. Under the proposed
framework, these factors would best be placed in a separate subsequent section that
relates to factors that are rooted in consequentialist rationales to allow for a provisional
desert-rooted censure.
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Tis methodology recognizes the importance of crafting proportionate
sentences and roots proportionality in a predominantly desert-based rationale.
Trough its frst two steps, the analysis is focused on individual desert-based
censure, which allows for this expressive aim to be met by determining a
provisional sentence, which is understood to be proportionate. In the event
that there are additional objectives and factors that are proven to achieve their
purported aims, which can be justifed, then a ft sentence can be determined
that takes these additional elements in account. Tis can be part of steps three,
four, and so on. Each of these additional steps can also be accompanied by their
own guidelines since they serve diferent rationales. For instance, in Canada,
an additional step could be “state blame,” which would have its own guidelines
and recognize an appropriate reduction of sentence (or other responses) based on
the level of state blame.155
In Canada, a body like a Sentencing Council,156 formed by plural groups
and voices, could draft guidelines by taking into account evolving knowledge on
sentencing. Tese guidelines could be context-specifc to jurisdictions and thus
the default sanction and anchoring need not be imprisonment;157 it could include
a myriad of other dynamic censuring responses, infused with individuality and
experiential understandings of proportionality and punishment.
C. RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT AND THE STATE’S LOSS
OF LEGITIMACY

A principled yet dynamic desert-based approach to proportionality would enable
greater recognition that some issues may be best addressed in systems that are
not punitive. A retributive or desert-based framework would be used only in
instances where censure is relevant to address blameworthy moral agents while
recognizing that other systems may best address other problems. A predominantly
consequentialist framework risks overreaching to include too many objectives
in sentencing, such as rehabilitative and restorative ones that are best achieved
outside a punitive process. Further, a desert-based approach to proportionality
would reject being associated with deterrence, the latter being classifed as
155. Tis dimension is beyond the scope of this article and is defned in Marie Manikis,
“Recognising State Blame in Sentencing: A Communicative and Relational Framework”
(2022) Cambridge LJ [forthcoming]. For its underlying rationale, found notably within
relational theories of responsibility, see Tadros, supra note 131.
156. Robbery Guideline, supra note 151.
157. Tis respects desert theory’s cardinal understanding of proportionality and would require
some changes in Canada since the current system is still in large part tied to incarceration for
certain ofences.
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consequentialist and, in great part, inefcient. As seen above, within a punitive
framework, these objectives also risk contributing to the over-representation
of marginalized groups by purporting to solve certain problems and by
focusing on risk.
Further, a consequentialist model of proportionality may create tensions
between retributive and consequentialist rationales of punishment, which may
limit the censuring dimension of punishment while also limiting the realization
of certain objectives. In Ipeelee, for example, a focus on the gravity of the ofence
and blame undermines rehabilitative and restorative eforts that could be achieved
outside the criminal process.158 Even in cases where individual blame is minimal
due to social deprivation, a consequentialist framework, whether it aims to
rehabilitate, restore relationships, or reduce the over-incarceration of Indigenous
people,159 operates within a punitive process that can limit the attainment of these
objectives. Rather, thought and resources could be invested in the development
of appropriate services160 and guidelines that enable and inform useful delegation
outside the criminal process. Legal pluralist approaches rooted in Indigenous
self-governance may be one way to enable the implementation of these aims
outside the proposed liberal approach.161
In addition, in cases of egregious state abuses like Nasogaluak,162 including
consequentialist objectives such as denouncing the state in the sentencing process
can inadvertently legitimize the state’s jurisdiction to punish despite egregious
abuse. Instead, there should be space,163 as part of decisions to prosecute and
sentencing, to recognize instances where the state loses its legitimacy to punish.
In such cases, discussed by Duf above, consequentialist objectives are best
addressed outside of the criminal process.
Finally, more refection is needed about the criminalization of certain
behaviours and the ways in which discretionary powers by police and prosecutors
158. Supra note 94.
159. Section 718.2(e) is seen as a remedial measure of the over-represented people in prisons. See
Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 718.2(e). Te Court highlights that sentencing judges can
endeavour to reduce crime rates in Indigenous communities by imposing sentences that deter
criminality and rehabilitate ofenders. See Ipeelee, supra note 94 at para 66.
160. Interventions outside the criminal process can include mechanisms of diversion, prevention,
and restorative processes.
161. Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau, “Ipeelee and the Duty to Resist” (2018)
51 UBC Law Rev 548.
162. Supra note 91
163. Tis may be found in the external factors (C) within the framework discussed in Figure 1,
above. Te determination of which forum or stage can be seen as the appropriate space is
beyond the scope of this article and best left for another day.
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are employed to determine the use of diversion or the inclusion of cases in the
criminal justice process. Sentencing is the end-game of a wider system that
upholds a punitive approach. Indeed, this framework would propel guidance
from a Sentencing Council to determine whether certain aims in certain
contexts, such as rehabilitation or restoration, would beneft from a delegation
of jurisdictional competence to more appropriate systems. Many goals are not
adequately reached through criminalization and punishment, but rather with
socio-economic changes in the wider societal fabric. If individuals are not
deserving of punishment, or if other objectives are considered more important,
the way forward is to rely on separate systems.

IV. CONCLUSION
Proportionality in sentencing can be rooted in various theoretical underpinnings of
punishment. Both retributive and consequentialist frameworks of proportionality
have shown dynamism through their recent conceptual evolutions. For instance,
a retributive-based conception of proportionality has evolved to allow for more
individualization and experiential approaches to blame and harm. Te variations
under consequentialist versions of proportionality are less focused, often grounded
in more hybrid and conficting rationales. Tus, they have been criticized for
rendering their conception of proportionality confusing and less meaningful.
Te Canadian context illustrates some of the evolving conceptions of
proportionality. Te Supreme Court of Canada has predominantly rooted
proportionality within desert, as intended by Parliament, and within this
framework, has integrated a dynamic conception of desert theory as seen with
notions of culpability in Ipeelee and harm in Friesen. Te Court has also expanded
its theoretical underpinnings, leading to a multiplication of conceptions of
proportionality—at times within the same judgment. Tis move risks making the
principle meaningless as it is sometimes rooted in dynamic desert, and in other
circumstances, understood as a broader concept used to attain various ill-defned
and confictual goals.
Tis article suggests that a clearer grounding of proportionality would root this
principle within dynamic desert, which would preserve a principled underlying
justifcation and enable a provisional sentence to meet its intended censure. Tis
would allow us to distinguish factors on the basis of their underlying justifcation
of punishment, enabling principled nuances and treatment in sentencing. In this
sense, factors rooted in desert would be considered relevant to proportionality
while others, rooted in consequentialist rationales, would be extraneous to this
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concept, yet may still be taken into account in the overall sentence if justifed and
efcient under a punitive system.
Tis framework provides legislatures and judges with guidance rooted in
clear and principled underpinnings. It proposes a methodology, similar to the
one in England and Wales, but rooted in the Canadian socio-legal context,
that limits arbitrariness and advances proportionality while providing space in
sentencing for the consideration of factors outside proportionality when justifed.
A sentencing body can be designed to implement this framework, which would
be cognizant of the importance of judicial discretion while requiring judges to
justify their decisions. In turn, judges would follow a consistent methodological
approach in which they would identify a proportionate sentence (provisional
sentence), followed by crafting an overall ft sentence when justifed and when
this difers from the proportionate one.
Tis framework would allow for a systemic refection on the pertinence of
incorporating certain objectives within a punitive criminal process. If an initial
desert-based approach is not appropriate, judges would have the jurisdiction
to defer to more appropriate systems that predominantly serve diferent aims.
As such, this approach recognizes the over-use of punitive approaches and calls
for better-suited external systems to address certain issues. Importantly, this
acknowledges the limits of punishment for achieving certain objectives and
facilitates the recognition that the state can lose its legitimacy to punish in
certain contexts.

